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Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess 
are known as guessing games or (p-)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full 
characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash 
equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the 
(discrete) set of available guesses to each player.
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In guessing games – also called (p-)beauty contests – each player chooses a number and the player whose number is 
closest to p times the average of all numbers wins a ﬁxed prize. Such a game with p = 23 was ﬁrst used in Ledoux (1981)
and brought to the attention of an economic audience by Moulin (1986). Since the seminal paper by Nagel (1995), guessing 
games have attracted a lot of interest among behavioral and experimental economists. Moreover, they have become the 
leading example for teaching iterative reasoning processes in game theory courses.
The popularity of this class of games results – at least partly – from the gap between empirical evidence and “theoretical 
predictions”. Roughly speaking, these predictions are typically based on the following informal reasoning: for p = 23 , two 
thirds of the average is further from the highest than from the second highest number irrespective of what the opponents 
choose. Therefore, the highest number will never be chosen. By iteratively applying the same reasoning, all numbers except 
the smallest one are eliminated.1 A similar argument suggests that for p > 1, only the highest number should be chosen.
In this note, we formalize the “theoretical predictions” using the two standard solution concepts, viz., rationalizability 
and Nash equilibrium. Rationalizability imposes two basic assumptions, namely that every player chooses a strategy that 
is optimal given his belief about the opponents strategies (rationality) and it is transparent across the players that every 
player is rational (common belief in rationality). Nash equilibrium additionally requires each player’s beliefs to be correct.
✩ We are indebted to Sebastian Ebert, an Associate Editor and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Elias thanks the Department of Economics 
at UC Davis for its hospitality while working on this project. This paper supersedes an earlier draft titled “Rationalizability in Guessing Games”.
* Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: c.seel@maastrichtuniversity.nl (C. Seel), e.tsakas@maastrichtuniversity.nl (E. Tsakas).
URLs: https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/c.seel (C. Seel), http://www.elias-tsakas.com/home.html (E. Tsakas).
1 Experimental ﬁndings are usually at odds with these predictions. This discrepancy is typically attributed to limited depth of reasoning and different 
behavioral models try to capture it, e.g., the level-k model (Ho et al., 1998; Bosch-Doménech et al., 2002) or the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 
2004).https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013
0899-8256/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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show that all (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria are symmetric. Moreover, we characterize the set of parameters p for which an 
arbitrary symmetric strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium. Our analysis generalizes the one of López (2001), who restricts 
attention to parameters p < 1 and integer guesses. Then, we characterize the set of rationalizable strategies as the set of 
guesses that lie between the “lowest” and the “highest” symmetric Nash equilibrium. For a large range of parameters, all 
guesses are rationalizable, i.e., there are no stupid guesses.
Subsequently, we focus on a special case that frequently appears in experiments, where the set of possible guesses 
consists of consecutive nonnegative integers. For p ≤ 1, a strategy is rationalizable if and only if it is part of a symmetric 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For p ≥ 1, there is a threshold parameter (equal to half of the number of players), such that 
only the highest guess is rationalizable for p above the threshold, but every guess is rationalizable otherwise.
This note does not intend to explain the differences between theoretical predictions and empirical ﬁndings. Instead, it 
provides an in-depth game-theoretic analysis for one of the most famous games in the literature. Moreover, it emphasizes 
that the aforementioned informal treatment is inappropriate for computing standard theoretical predictions and that caution 
in experimental design and (undergraduate) teaching is asked for.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 sets up the general model and derives the main results. Readers who are familiar with 
the model and only interested in the predictions for the most frequently analyzed case in experiments can skip to Section 3. 
A sketch of the proofs is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss extensions of the model. The details of the proofs 
are presented in the Appendix.
2. Setting and main results
Consider a (symmetric) normal form game with I = {1, . . . , N} being the set of players, where N ≥ 2. For each player i ∈ I , 
the set of pure strategies (guesses) is denoted by Si = {a0, a1, . . . , aM} with 0 ≤ a0 < a1 < · · · < aM < ∞ and M ≥ 1. A typical 
element of Si is denoted by si . For a given pure strategy proﬁle (s1, . . . , sN ), the target guess is deﬁned as 
p
N
∑
j∈I s j , where 
p ∈R+ is an exogenous parameter. Players compete for a ﬁxed prize. The player whose guess is closest to the target guess 
wins the prize; ties are broken randomly with equal probability. All players are assumed to be expected utility maximizers.
If N = 2, it is straightforward that for p < 1 (resp., for p > 1) the only Nash equilibrium is the pure strategy proﬁle 
(a0, a0) (resp., the pure strategy proﬁle (aM , aM)), whereas for p = 1 every strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, 
we henceforth focus on games with at least three players. To characterize the set of Nash equilibria, we introduce some 
parameter thresholds. In particular, let
pm := N
2
· am−1 + am
am−1 + (N − 1)am
for each m ∈ {1, . . . , M}, with the convention p0 := 0. Moreover, deﬁne
qm := N
2
· am+1 + am
am+1 + (N − 1)am
for every m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}, with the convention qM := ∞. Note that for N > 2, we have pm < 1 < qm for every m ∈
{0, 1, . . . , M}.2
Theorem 1 (Characterization of Nash equilibria). Every (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium is symmetric. Moreover, the following state-
ments are true for every m ∈ {0, . . . , M}:
(i) For p ≤ 1, the strategy proﬁle (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if p ≥ pm.
(ii) For p ≥ 1, the strategy proﬁle (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if p ≤ qm.
Remark 1. By our conventions p0 = 0 and qM = ∞, it follows directly that (a0, . . . , a0) is a Nash equilibrium for every p ≤ 1
and (aM , . . . , aM) is a Nash equilibrium for every p ≥ 1.
We now turn attention to rationalizability. For each player i ∈ I , let R0i := Si and inductively deﬁne the strategies Rki ⊆ Si
that survive k rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies (for a formal deﬁnition of Rki , see the appendix). Then, 
R∗i :=
⋂∞
k=0 Rki contains the (correlated) rationalizable strategies. These are exactly the strategies that can be played under 
rationality and common belief in rationality (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987; Tan and Werlang, 1988).3
2 This follows from pm (resp., qm) being strictly decreasing (resp., strictly increasing) in N , combined with the fact that pm = qm = 1 when N = 2.
3 For the rest of the paper, the term rationalizability refers to the concept of correlated rationalizability. In general, correlated rationalizability is a 
coarsening of Bernheim’s (1984) and Pearce’s (1984) (independent) rationalizability. In Section 5.1, we show that both rationalizability concepts yield 
exactly the same predictions for our model.
C. Seel, E. Tsakas / Games and Economic Behavior 106 (2017) 75–88 77Fig. 1. Rationalizable strategies and Nash equilibria for N = 3, M = 3, Si = {0, 10, 11, 20} and varying p. The symbol ✓ (resp., ✗) signiﬁes that the cor-
responding symmetric pure-strategy proﬁle is (resp., is not) a Nash equilibrium for parameters p within the interval. The shaded area consists of all 
parameters such the respective strategy is rationalizable.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of rationalizable strategies). A strategy si ∈ Si is rationalizable if and only if there exist symmetric 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria, (am, . . . , am) and (an, . . . , an), such that am ≤ si ≤ an. In particular, the following statements hold:
(i) For p ≤ 1, the rationalizable strategies are {a0, . . . , am} with m = max{ ∈ {0, . . . , M} : p ≥ p}.
(ii) For p ≥ 1, the rationalizable strategies are {am, . . . , aM} with m = min{ ∈ {0, . . . , M} : p ≤ q}.
Remark 2. Since p0 = 0 and qM = ∞, both { ∈ {0, . . . , M} : p ≥ p} and { ∈ {0, . . . , M} : p ≤ q} are nonempty and ﬁnite 
sets. Thus, they attain a maximum and a minimum respectively.
The following example provides an illustration of the main insights of Theorems 1 and 2.
Example 1. Let N = 3, M = 3 and Si = {1, 10, 11, 20}. We obtain (p1, p2, p3) = ( 1114 , 6364 , 3134 ) and (q0, q1, q2) = ( 118 , 6362 , 3128 ), 
i.e., we have p2 > p3 > p1 and q1 < q2 < q0. Thus we can partition the set of values p ∈ R+ into intervals and use our 
theorems to obtain the rationalizable strategies and the Nash equilibria within each of these intervals, as shown in Fig. 1.
Note that the set of Nash equilibria is not always “connected”. For instance, when p ∈ (p3, p2), the proﬁles (20, 20, 20)
and (10, 10, 10) are both Nash equilibria, but (11, 11, 11) is not. Intuitively, since pm and qm are not always monotonic in m, 
the conditions of Theorem 1 are sometimes satisﬁed for extreme values of m and not for intermediate ones.
Unlike the set of Nash equilibria, the set of rationalizable strategies is always “connected”. More precisely, by Theorem 2, 
the set of rationalizable strategies are those between the “lowest” and the “highest” Nash equilibrium. As pm and qm are 
not always monotonic in m, however, the set of rationalizable strategies may “jump” while p increases. In our example, 
for p < p3 the set of rationalizable strategies is {0, 10}, whereas for p ≥ p3 the set of rationalizable strategies becomes 
{0, 10, 11, 20}.
3. The famous special case
In this section, we consider the special case with a strategy set Si = {0, 1, . . . , M} with typical element m, which has been 
extensively studied in the experimental literature (e.g., see Ledoux, 1981; Nagel, 1995) and is often presented in textbooks.
Deﬁne two thresholds pm = 2Nm−N2Nm−2 and qm = 2Nm+N2Nm+2 , maintaining the convention that p0 = 0 and qM = ∞. Theorem 2
from Section 2 reduces to the following corollaries:
Corollary 1. For p ≤ 1, a strategy m ∈ {0, . . . , M} is rationalizable if and only if p ≥ pm.
Corollary 2. For p ≥ 1, the following statements hold:
(i) All strategies m ∈ {0, . . . , M} are rationalizable if p ≤ N2 .
(ii) Only the strategy m = M is rationalizable if p > N2 .
We can decompose the parameter space into three regions (see also Fig. 2). In Region 1 (p < pM), more guesses become 
rationalizable as p increases. Region 2 [pM , N2 ] is the “experimenter’s nightmare”, viz., the region of no stupid guesses, where 
all strategies are rationalizable. Finally, in Region 3 (p > N2 ), only the highest guess is rationalizable. The parametrization 
in the original implementation by Ledoux (1981), where p = 23 and N = 2898, falls in Region 1 and only strategies m ∈
{0, 1} are rationalizable. The treatment in the seminal paper by Nagel (1995), where p = 43 and N ∈ {15, 16, 17, 18} falls in 
Region 2, i.e., all guesses are rationalizable.
The following example discusses the relation of rationalizable strategies and Nash equilibria in the general case versus 
the special case in more detail.
Example 2. As is often assumed in experiments, let M = 100. The Nash equilibria and the rationalizable strategies are 
illustrated in Fig. 2 in a similar way as in Fig. 1 above.
78 C. Seel, E. Tsakas / Games and Economic Behavior 106 (2017) 75–88Fig. 2. Rationalizable strategies and Nash equilibria for M = 100, i.e., Si = {0, 1, . . . , 100} and varying p. The symbol ✓ (resp., ✗) signiﬁes that the cor-
responding symmetric pure-strategy proﬁle is (resp., is not) a Nash equilibrium for parameters p within the interval. The shaded area consists of all 
parameters such the respective strategy is rationalizable.
For p < 1, unlike in the general case, the set of Nash equilibria is “connected” and it coincides with the set of ratio-
nalizable strategies. This is why the condition p ≥ pm – used to characterize the set of Nash equilibria in Theorem 1 (i) – 
is also used here to identify the set of rationalizable strategies (Corollary 1). Furthermore, the fact that pm is monotonic 
in m guarantees that for every m ∈ {0, . . . , 100} there is some p ∈ (0, 1) such that the set of rationalizable strategies is 
R∗i = {0, . . . , m}, i.e., there are no jumps of the highest rationalizable strategy as p increases, unlike in Example 1.
For p > N2 , we have p > qm for every m ∈ {0, . . . , 99}. Thus, no strategy proﬁle (m, . . . , m) with m < 100 is a Nash 
equilibrium by Theorem 1 (ii) and hence no m ∈ {0, . . . , 99} is rationalizable. That is, if m = 0 is eliminated then every 
strategy below M = 100 will eventually be eliminated. On the other hand, if p ∈ [1, N2 ], the lowest strategy m = 0 is not 
eliminated, and the unraveling does not begin. Finally, note that even in the special case, for some p > 1, the set of Nash 
equilibria is “disconnected”.
4. Sketch of the proofs
We split each proof into some intermediate steps, summarized in Lemmas 1–2 for Theorem 1 and Lemmas 3–4 for 
Theorem 2. This section only presents the general idea behind the proofs. The complete arguments are relegated to the 
appendix.
4.1. Theorem 1: Nash equilibria
Symmetry: Suppose there are at most two different guesses (say am and an) chosen in equilibrium and that each player 
wins with positive probability. Since there are at least three players, one of the two guesses (say an) is picked by at least 
two players (say i and j). Now suppose that i switches to am . In this case, the target guess moves closer to am , meaning that 
j is not among the possible winners anymore and thus the probability of i winning increases. Hence, the original strategy 
proﬁle (with both am and an chosen by some players) is not a Nash equilibrium. Thus, only symmetric strategy proﬁles can 
be Nash equilibria.
Let us proceed with Parts (i) and (ii) of the theorem. For notation simplicity, let a¯m denote the strategy proﬁle where all 
players choose am and let a¯−im denote that every j = i chooses am .
The next lemma shows that for p ≤ 1, only downward deviations can be proﬁtable. Moreover, if proﬁtable deviations 
exist, the one-step downward deviation is one of those. Consequently, the symmetric pure-strategy proﬁle (a0, . . . , a0) is 
always a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Let p ≤ 1. If am−1 is not a proﬁtable deviation from (am, . . . , am) then there is no proﬁtable deviation, i.e., (am, . . . , am) is 
a Nash equilibrium. In particular:
(i) For an arbitrary m ∈ {2, . . . , M}, if n ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} then ui(an, ¯a−im ) ≥ ui(an−1, ¯a−im ).
(ii) For an arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}, if n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M} then ui(a¯m) > ui(an, ¯a−im ).
Hence, for every m ∈ {1, . . . , M}, the symmetric pure-strategy proﬁle (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the 
one-step downward deviation to am−1 is not proﬁtable. In turn, this is the case if and only if p ≥ pm . This completes the 
proof of Theorem 1 (i).
The next lemma is analogous to Lemma 1 for p ≥ 1. In particular, it shows that only upward deviations can be prof-
itable. Furthermore, if there are proﬁtable deviations, the one-step upward deviation is one of those. As a consequence, the 
symmetric pure-strategy proﬁle (aM , . . . , aM) is always a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. Let p ≥ 1. If am+1 is not a proﬁtable deviation from (am, . . . , am) then there is no proﬁtable deviation, and therefore 
(am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium. In particular:
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(ii) For an arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 2}, if n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M − 1} then ui(an, ¯a−im ) ≥ ui(an+1, ¯a−im ).
Therefore, for every m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}, the symmetric pure-strategy proﬁle (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium if and 
only if the one-step upward deviation to am+1 is not proﬁtable. This is the case whenever p ≤ qm , thus proving Theorem 1
(ii).
4.2. Theorem 2: rationalizable strategies
We will use the following two lemmas to prove that, if the symmetric strategy proﬁles (am, . . . , am) and (an, . . . , an) are 
Nash equilibria (with m ≤ n), the (symmetric) product set
Cm,n1 × · · · × Cm,nN (1)
is a best response set, where Cm,ni := {am, . . . , an}.4 This directly implies that every si ∈ Cm,ni is rationalizable. Then, for each 
of the two cases, p ≤ 1 and p ≥ 1, we take the “lowest” and the “highest” Nash equilibrium and we show that every strategy 
outside the range of these extreme Nash equilibria is eliminated by iterated strict dominance.
For notation simplicity, for each m ∈ {0, . . . , M} we deﬁne two reduced games of interest by Bmi = {a0, . . . , am} and 
Ami = {am, . . . , aM}, viz., Bm1 × · · · × BmN is the game that we obtain after having eliminated all the strategies that are larger 
than m, whereas Am1 ×· · ·× AmN is the game that we obtain after having eliminated all the strategies that are smaller than m.
Lemma 3. Let p ≤ 1 and ﬁx an arbitrary m ∈ {1, . . . , M}. The following statements hold:
(i) am−1 is a best response to some s−i ∈ S−i with s j ∈ {am−1, am} for all j = i.
(ii) If (am, . . . , am) is not a Nash equilibrium, then am is strictly dominated in Bm1 × · · · × BmN .
By Theorem 1 (i), the “lowest” Nash equilibrium is (a0, . . . , a0). Therefore, once we ﬁnd the “highest” Nash equilibrium 
(am, . . . , am), every an ∈ {a0, . . . , am} is rationalizable. Indeed, by Lemma 3 (i), am is a best response to everybody else 
choosing am , am−1 is a best response to some s−i such that everybody else chooses either am or am−1, and so on until we 
reach a0 which is a best response to everybody else choosing a0.
Now we focus on strategies larger than the “highest” Nash equilibrium (assuming M > am) to show that all of them 
are iteratively eliminated. In particular, since (aM , . . . , aM) is not a Nash equilibrium, it is strictly dominated by a mixed 
strategy in ({a0, . . . , aM−1}). This mixed strategy puts suﬃciently high probability on aM−1 and uniformly distributes the 
remaining mass to all other strategies. In fact, in the proof of Lemma 3 (ii), we explicitly identify this mixed strategy. We 
continue inductively, until all strategies an ∈ {am+1, . . . , aM} have been iteratively eliminated, thus completing the proof of 
Theorem 2 (i).
Lemma 4. Let p ≥ 1 and ﬁx an arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}. The following statements hold:
(i) am+1 is a best response to some s−i ∈ S−i with s j ∈ {am, am+1} for all j = i.
(ii) If (am, . . . , am) is not a Nash equilibrium, then am is strictly dominated in Am1 × · · · × AmN .
Similar to the previous case, the “highest” Nash equilibrium is (aM , . . . , aM), and after ﬁnding the “lowest” Nash equilib-
rium (am, . . . , am), we show that every an ∈ {am, . . . , aM} is rationalizable. Subsequently, we show that strategies larger than 
the “highest” Nash equilibrium are iteratively eliminated, thus completing the proof of Theorem 2 (ii).
5. Discussion
5.1. Independent rationalizability
As mentioned, we employ the notion of correlated rationalizability, which in general coarsens Bernheim’s (1984) and 
Pearce’s (1984) notion of (independent) rationalizability. Nevertheless, as we show below, the two concepts yield the same 
predictions for guessing games.
For each player i ∈ I , let S0i := Si and inductively deﬁne the strategies Ski ⊆ Si that survive k rounds of elimination 
of Bernheim’s (1984) and Pearce’s (1984) procedure (a formal deﬁnition of Ski is presented in the Appendix). Then, S
∗
i :=⋂∞
k=1 Ski consists of the independently rationalizable strategies.
4 A product set C1 × · · · × CN ⊆ S1 × · · · × SN is a best response set whenever every si ∈ Ci is rational for some belief in (C−i). A formal deﬁnition is 
presented in the appendix.
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R∗i = S∗i .
Intuitively the proof follows directly from Lemma 3 (for p ≤ 1) and Lemma 4 (for p ≥ 1). In particular, we show that the 
best response set in (1) is an independent best response set, as each strategy in Cm,ni is a best response to a pure strategy 
proﬁle in Cm,n−i , i.e., it is rational to a product measure over C
m,n
−i .
5.2. Rounds of elimination
It is well-known that a strategy survives k rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies if and only if it can be 
rationally played under (k − 1)-fold belief in rationality. Since the game is often used to illustrate iterative reasoning, we 
want to see which strategies survive k rounds of elimination. The following result characterizes each step of the elimination 
procedure. Recall that the set of rationalizable strategies is of the form of R∗i = {a0, . . . , am} when p ≤ 1 and of the form of 
R∗i = {am, . . . , aM} when p ≥ 1.
Proposition 2. Fix an arbitrary p ∈R+ . At each round of elimination of strictly dominated strategies, at most one strategy is deleted. 
In particular, the following statements hold:
(i) Fix p ≤ 1. Then, Rk+1i = Rki \ {aM−k} for all k < M −m, and Rk+1i = Rki for all k ≥ M −m.
(ii) Fix p ≥ 1. Then, Rk+1i = Rki \ {ak} for all k <m, and Rk+1i = Rki for all k ≥m.
For p ≤ 1 (resp., for p ≥ 1), as long as there are still strategies that are not rationalizable, we can only eliminate the 
highest (resp., the lowest) remaining strategy, since the second highest (resp., the second lowest) is still rational against the 
strategies that remain, by Lemma 3 (i) (resp., by Lemma 4 (i)). Thus, the elimination process is very slow, i.e., depending on 
the parameters, a high belief in rationality might be needed to end up with the set of rationalizable strategies.
5.3. The discrete limit and continuous strategy sets
In this section, we illustrate what happens as the difference between the guesses converges to zero and we consider the 
case of continuous strategies. We focus on the case p ≤ 1 and strategy sets of the form Si = {0, , 2, . . . , M}, where M
is an integer-multiple of . In this case, the threshold such that the strategy proﬁle (s, . . . , s) is a Nash equilibrium and 
therefore s is rationalizable is ps ≥ 2Ns−N2Ns−2 .
Intuitively, in the main text, if there are many players, a downward deviation by a unit might not drag the target guess 
enough towards s −  to make this deviation proﬁtable. As the step size goes to zero, however, this effect disappears: note 
that lim→0 ps = 1, i.e., strategy s is not rationalizable for any p < 1.
Finally, suppose we start with a continuous strategy set Si = [0, M] where M is a positive real number. In this case, it is 
straightforward that the only symmetric Nash equilibrium is (0, . . . , 0) for p < 1. For rationalizability, the main diﬃculty is 
that Pearce’s (1984) Lemma does not directly extend to inﬁnite games. Hence, we cannot conclude that eliminating strictly 
dominated strategies is equivalent to eliminating strategies that are not rational for any belief. Let us focus on eliminating at 
each round strategies that are not rational.5 Then for an arbitrary p < 1, only M is eliminated at the ﬁrst round. Moreover, 
at the second round, all strategies are rational. Indeed, for each m < M , there is some n ∈ (m, M) such that m is rational to 
everybody else choosing n. Hence, every m ∈ [0, M) is rationalizable.
Appendix A
Let us ﬁrst introduce some additional notation. Recall that I = {1, . . . , N} and Si := {a0, a1, . . . , aM} with N > 2 and 
M ≥ 2. We deﬁne S :=×i∈I Si with typical element s = (s1, . . . , sN), and S−i :=×j =i S j with typical element s−i =
(s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN ). Moreover, let us denote by a¯m ∈ S the symmetric strategy proﬁle according to which si = am
for all i ∈ I , and by a¯−im ∈ S−i the strategy proﬁle of the opponents where s j = am for every j = i. As usual, a reduced game 
is deﬁned by means of a product set C = C1 × · · · × CN where Ci ⊆ Si for each player i ∈ I , together with the original utility 
function restricted to the set C . As usual we deﬁne C−i :=×j =i C j . For each m ∈ {0, . . . , M} we deﬁne two (symmetric) 
reduced games of interest, viz., we take Ci = Bmi and Ci = Ami , with Bmi = {a0, . . . , am} and Ami = {am, . . . , aM} respectively.
Recall that all players are expected utility maximizers. Since there are only two outcomes – i.e., winning and losing the 
prize – we can normalize without loss of generality the respective vNM utility indexes to 0 and 1. Formally, for an arbitrary 
s ∈ S we deﬁne the target guess
t(s) = p
N
∑
j∈I
s j,
5 This procedure is common in the literature on games with continuous strategy spaces (e.g., see Arieli, 2010).
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di(s) := |si − t(s)|,
with W (s) := {i ∈ I : di(s) ≤ d j(s) for all j ∈ I} being the respective set of winners. Then, the vNM utility of player i ∈ I from 
a pure strategy proﬁle s ∈ S is given by ui(s) := 1|W (s)| if i ∈ W (s) and ui(s) = 0 otherwise.
A strategy proﬁle (s1, . . . , sN) is a Nash equilibrium if ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) for every s′i ∈ Si and every i ∈ I .
We deﬁne a mixed strategy σi ∈ (Si) as a randomization over i’s own strategies, and deﬁne i’s expected utility from σi
given some s−i by ui(σi, s−i) =∑si∈Si σi(si) · ui(si, s−i). We deﬁne a belief μi ∈ (S−i) of player i as a probability measure 
over the opponents’ strategy proﬁles, and we deﬁne i’s expected utility from si given μi , by ui(si, μi) =∑s−i∈S−i μi(s−i) ·
ui(si, s−i). A belief μi is called independent if there exists some mixed strategy proﬁle (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σN) of i’s 
opponents such that μi = ⊗ j =i σ j , i.e., if μi is a product measure assigning probability μi(s−i) =
∏
j =i σ j(s j) to each 
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN) ∈ S−i . The belief is called correlated if it is not independent. A strategy si ∈ Si is called 
rational in the game C1 × · · · × CN if there exists some – not necessarily independent – belief μi ∈ (C−i) such that 
ui(si, μi) ≥ ui(s′i, μi) for all s′i ∈ Ci . It follows from Pearce’s (1984) Lemma that si is rational in C1 × · · · × CN if and only 
if it is not strictly dominated by any mixed strategy in C1 × · · · × CN , i.e., if and only if there is no σi ∈ (Ci) such that 
ui(σi, s−i) > ui(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈ C−i .
For each i ∈ I , we let R0i := Si , and for each k > 0 we inductively deﬁne the strategies Rki := {si ∈ Rk−1i : si is rational in
Rk−11 × · · · × Rk−1N } surviving k rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Then, R∗i :=
⋂∞
k=0 Rki consists of the 
(correlated) rationalizable strategies. For each i ∈ I , we let S0i := Si , and for each k > 0 we inductively deﬁne the set 
Ski := {si ∈ Sk−1i : si is rational for some independent belief in Sk−11 × · · · × Sk−1N }. Then, S∗i :=
⋂∞
k=0 Ski consists of the (in-
dependent) rationalizable strategies à la Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
A reduced game C1 × · · · × CN is a best response set (resp., independent best response set) whenever every si ∈ Ci is 
rational given some belief (resp., given some independent belief) μi ∈ (C−i). Then, it is well known that if C1 × · · · × CN
is a best response set (resp., an independent best response set) then Ci ⊆ R∗i (resp., Ci ⊆ S∗i ) for every i ∈ I .
A.1. Intermediate results
Lemma A.1. For every s−i ∈ S−i there exists some si ∈ Si such that ui(si, s−i) ≥ 1/N.
Proof. Since at most N players tie, we have ui(si, s−i) > 0 implies ui(si, s−i) ≥ 1/N . Thus, it suﬃces to show ui(si, s−i) > 0. 
Fix an arbitrary s−i ∈ S−i and deﬁne the function δi(si) := si − t(si, s−i), which is linear and therefore continuous in R+ . 
Consider the following three cases:
• δi(a0) ≥ 0: Then, s j ≥ a0 ≥ t(s) for all j = i, and therefore ui(a0, s−i) > 0.
• δi(aM) ≤ 0: Then, s j ≤ aM ≤ t(s) for all j = i, and therefore ui(aM , s−i) > 0.
• δi(a0) < 0 and δi(aM) > 0: By the intermediate value theorem, there exists some a ∈ (a0, aM) such that δi(a) = 0. 
Obviously if a ∈ Si then ui(a, s−i) > 0 and we are done. Hence, let us take a /∈ Si . We deﬁne am := max{si ∈ Si : si < a}
and am+1 := min{si ∈ Si : si > a}. Consider the following three subcases:
◦ N = p: Then, δi becomes constant in si . In particular, δi(a0) = δi(aM). Hence, we are back to one of the previous two 
cases.
◦ N < p: Then, δi becomes strictly decreasing in si and therefore si < t(si, s−i) for every si ∈ {am+1, . . . , aM}. Hence, 
t(aM , s−i) > aM which contradicts δi(aM) > 0.
◦ N > p: Then, δi becomes strictly increasing in si and therefore am < t(am, s−i) and am+1 > t(am+1, s−i). Moreover, 
since t is strictly increasing, am < t(am, s−i) < t(am+1, s−i) < am+1. Hence, at least one of the two guesses wins with 
positive probability, i.e., either ui(am, s−i) > 0 (viz., if t(am, s−i) < t(am+1, s−i) < 12 (am+1 − am)) or ui(am+1, s−i) > 0
(viz., if 12 (am+1 − am) < t(am, s−i) < t(am+1, s−i)) or both ui(am, s−i) > 0 and ui(am+1, s−i) > 0 (viz., if t(am, s−i) <
1
2 (am+1 − am) < t(am+1, s−i)).
Combining the previous cases completes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma A.2. Fix an arbitrary p ≤ 1.
(i) Fix an arbitrary m ∈ {2, . . . , M} and an arbitrary s−i ∈ S−i such that s j ≥ am for every j = i. Then ui(an, s−i) ≥ ui(an−1, s−i) for 
all n ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}.
(ii) Fix an arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1} and an arbitrary s−i ∈ S−i such that s j ≤ am for all j = i. Then ui(an, s−i) = 0 for all 
n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M}.
Proof. (i) Fix arbitrary m ∈ {2, . . . , M} and n ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}. Without loss of generality, take some s−i with m =
min{s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN }. Then it is straightforward to verify that ui(an, s−i) ≥ 1 if and only if di(an, s−i) ≤ d j(an, s−i)N
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ui(an, s−i) = 1. Observe that di(an, s−i) ≤ d j(an, s−i) is equivalent to
p ≤ N
2
· an + am
an +∑ j =i s j , (A.1)
which holds with equality if and only if di(an, s−i) = d j(an, s−i). Notice that (by N > 2 and ∑ j =i s j ≥ (N − 1)am > am), the 
right-hand side of (A.1) is strictly increasing in n. Hence, if (A.1) holds for n − 1 then it also holds (with strict inequality) 
for n. In other words, if ui(an−1, s−i) = 0 then it is trivially the case that ui(an−1, s−i) ≤ ui(an, s−i), whereas if ui(an−1,
s−i) ≥ 1N it will necessarily be the case that ui(an, s−i) = 1, thus completing this part of the proof.
(ii) Fix arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1} and n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M}, and without loss of generality let m = max{s1, . . . , si−1, si+1,
. . . , sN}. Then the target guess under the strategy proﬁle (an, s−i) is
t(an, s−i) = p
N
(
an +
∑
j =i
s j
)
≤ 1
N
(
an + (N − 1)am
)
<
1
2
(an + am),
with the second strict inequality holding due to N > 2 and an > am . Hence, di(an, s−i) > d j(an, s−i) where j = i is an 
opponent of i such that s j = am . Hence, ui(an, s−i) = 0. 
Lemma A.3. Fix an arbitrary p ≥ 1.
(i) Fix an arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M −2} and an arbitrary s−i ∈ S−i such that s j ≤ am for every j = i. Then ui(an, s−i) ≥ ui(an+1, s−i)
for all n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M − 1}.
(ii) Fix an arbitrary m ∈ {1, . . . , M} and an arbitrary s−i ∈ S−i such that s j ≥ am for all j = i and ui(am, s−i) > 0. Then ui(am, s−i) >
ui(an, s−i) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}.
Proof. (i) The proof is similar to one of Lemma A.2 (i). Indeed ﬁx arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 2} and n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M − 1}. 
Without loss of generality take some s−i ∈ S−i such that m = max{s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN}. Then, we obtain ui(an, s−i) ≥ 1N
if and only if
p ≥ N
2
· an + am
an +∑ j =i s j . (A.2)
In particular, 1N ≤ ui(an, s−i) < 1 if and only if (A.2) holds with equality, whereas ui(an, s−i) = 1 if and only if (A.2) holds 
with strict inequality. Whenever (A.2) does not hold, we obtain ui(an, s−i) = 0. The right-hand side of (A.2) is strictly 
increasing in n. Hence, if ui(an+1, s−i) = 0 then ui(an+1, s−i) ≤ ui(an, s−i) holds trivially, whereas if ui(an+1, s−i) ≥ 1N then 
ui(an, s−i) = 1, thus completing this part of the proof.
(ii) The proof is identical to the one of Lemma A.2 (ii). For every m ∈ {1, . . . , M} and every n ∈ {0, . . . , m −1}, without loss 
of generality take some s−i ∈ S−i with m =min{s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN}. Then, we obtain t(an, s−i) > 12 (an + am) using the 
same argument as above. Hence, di(an, s−i) > d j(an, s−i) where j = i is an opponent of i such that s j = am , and therefore 
ui(an, s−i) = 0. 
A.2. Proofs of Section 4.1
Proof of Lemma 1. The result is a direct corollary of Lemma A.2 for s j = am for all j = i. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The result is a direct corollary of Lemma A.3 for s j = am for all j = i. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (s1, . . . , sN) be a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma A.1, there exists some s∗i ∈ Si such that ui(s∗i , s−i) ≥
1/N , and therefore ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s∗i , s−i) ≥ 1/N . Moreover, by the rules of the game, 
∑
i∈I ui(s1, . . . , sN ) = 1, thus implying 
ui(s1, . . . , sN) = 1/N for every i ∈ I . Hence |si − t(s1, . . . , sN)| = c ∈ R+ for every i ∈ I . Thus, there are at most two guesses 
am, an ∈ Si such that si ∈ {am, an} for every i ∈ I . Without loss of generality let am < an . Suppose – contrary to what we 
want to prove – that there exists a strict nonempty subset J  I of the players choosing am and the rest choosing an , 
i.e., assume that J = {i ∈ I : si = am} and I \ J = {i ∈ I : si = an}, with 0 < | J | < N . Hence, the target guess t(s1, . . . , sN ) =
p
N (| J |am + (N − | J |)an) is equal to (am + an)/2. Since N > 2, we obtain | J | ≥ 2 or N − | J | ≥ 2. If | J | ≥ 2, let i ∈ J switch 
from am to an , in which case the target guess satisﬁes
C. Seel, E. Tsakas / Games and Economic Behavior 106 (2017) 75–88 83t(s1, . . . , si−1,an, si+1, . . . , sN) = p
N
(
(| J | − 1)am + (N − | J | + 1)an
)
>
p
N
(| J |am + (N − | J |)an)
= 1
2
(am + an).
Thus, the | J | − 1 players in J \ {i} do not win and ui(s1, . . . , si−1, an, si+1, . . . , sN) = 1N−| J |+1 > 1N = ui(s1, . . . , sN ), which 
contradicts (s1, . . . , sN ) being a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, if N − | J | ≥ 2, any deviation of a player j ∈ I \ J from an to 
am is proﬁtable, a contradiction to (s1, . . . , sN ) being a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, any Nash equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., 
si = am for all i ∈ I .
(i) It follows from Lemma 1 (ii) that (a0, . . . , a0) is always a Nash equilibrium. Thus, by our convention p0 = 0, it follows 
directly that (a0, . . . , a0) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if p ≥ p0. Fix an arbitrary m ∈ {1, . . . , M}. By Lemma 1, the 
strategy proﬁle (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if di(am−1, ¯a−im ) ≥ d j(am−1, ¯a−im ). The latter is equivalent to 
p
N (am−1 + (N − 1)am) ≥ 12 (am−1 + am), which is in turn equivalent to p ≥ pm .
(ii) It follows from Lemma 2 (ii) that (aM , . . . , aM) is always a Nash equilibrium. Thus, by our convention pM = ∞, the 
proﬁle (aM , . . . , aM) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if p ≤ pM . Now ﬁx an arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , M −1}. Then, by Lemma 2, 
the strategy proﬁle (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if di(am+1, ¯a−im ) ≥ d j(am+1, ¯a−im ), which is equivalent to 
p
N (am+1 + (N − 1)am) ≤ 12 (am+1 + am), which is in turn equivalent to p ≤ qm , thus completing the proof. 
A.3. Proofs of Section 4.2
Lemma A.4. For an arbitrary m ∈ {1, . . . , M}, let p < pm and consider an arbitrary s−i ∈ Bm−i . If ui(am, s−i) > 0 then ui(am−1, s−i) >
ui(am, s−i).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary s−i ∈ Bm−i such that ui(am, s−i) > 0. First, it follows by Theorem 1 (i) that s−i = a¯−im , i.e., there exists 
some k = i such that sk = an < am . Without loss of generality let an ≥ s j for every j = i such that s j = am , i.e., among 
the opponents of i who do not choose am , player k chooses the highest number. Then it follows from ui(am, s−i) > 0, that 
t(am, s−i) ≥ 12 (am + an). Let us ﬁrst prove that an < am−1. Suppose not, i.e., assume that an = am−1, in which case
t(am, s−i) = p
N
(
am +
∑
j =i
s j
)
≤ p
N
(
(N − 1)am + am−1
)
= t(am−1, a¯−im )
<
1
2
(am + am−1),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (am, . . . , am) is not a Nash equilibrium (see Theorem 1) together with 
the fact that the only candidate for a proﬁtable deviation is am−1 (see Lemma 1). But then, there exists a player choosing 
am−1, thus contradicting ui(am, s−i) > 0. Hence, it must necessarily be the case that an < am−1, i.e., no opponent chooses 
am−1. Now consider the strategy proﬁle (am−1, s−i) and obtain
t(am−1, s−i) = t(am, s−i) − p
N
(am − am−1)
>
1
2
(am + an) − 1
2
(am − am−1)
= 1
2
(am−1 + an),
implying that di(am−1, s−i) < d j(am−1, s−i) for every j = i with s j < am−1. Finally, notice that
t(am−1, s−i) < t(am−1, a¯−im )
<
1
2
(am−1 + am),
with the second inequality following from a¯m not being a Nash equilibrium. Hence, di(am−1, s−i) < d j(am−1, s−i) for every 
j = i with s j > am−1. This implies that ui(am−1, s−i) = 1. Thus, it suﬃces to prove that ui(am, s−i) < 1. Suppose otherwise, 
i.e., let s j ≤ an for every j = i. Then, from Lemma A.2, we would obtain ui(am, s−i) = 0, thus completing the proof. 
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ui(am+1, s−i) > ui(am, s−i).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of A.4 above. Fix an arbitrary s−i ∈ Am−i such that ui(am, s−i) > 0. First, it follows 
by Theorem 1 (ii) that s−i = a¯−im . Without loss of generality let an ≤ s j for every j = i such that s j = am . Then it follows 
from ui(am, s−i) > 0, that t(am, s−i) ≤ 12 (am + an). Using the same arguments as above, we ﬁrst show that an > am+1. Now 
consider the strategy proﬁle (am+1, s−i) to obtain
t(am+1, s−i) = t(am, s−i) − p
N
(am+1 − am)
<
1
2
(am+1 + an),
implying that di(am+1, s−i) < d j(am+1, s−i) for every j = i with s j > am+1. Finally, notice that
t(am+1, s−i) < t(am+1, a¯−im )
<
1
2
(am−1 + am),
with the second inequality following from a¯m not being a Nash equilibrium. Hence, di(am+1, s−i) < d j(am+1, s−i) for every 
j = i with s j < am+1. This implies that ui(am+1, s−i) = 1. Hence, it suﬃces to prove that ui(am, s−i) < 1. Suppose otherwise, 
i.e., let s j ≥ an for every j = i. Then, from Lemma A.3, we would obtain ui(am, s−i) = 0, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Fix some m ∈ {1, . . . , M} and deﬁne a strategy proﬁle
sκm = ( am, . . . ,am︸ ︷︷ ︸
N − κ − 1 times
,am−1, . . . ,am−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ times
) ∈ S−i,
where κ ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} of i’s opponents choose am−1 and the remaining ones choose am . Then, it suﬃces to prove that 
am−1 is a best response to some s−i ∈ {s0m, s1m, . . . , sN−1m }. If (am, . . . , am) is not a Nash equilibrium, am−1 is a best response 
to s0m = a¯−im (by Lemma 1). If (am−1, . . . , am−1) is a Nash equilibrium, am−1 is trivially a best response to sN−1m = a¯−im−1. So, we 
focus on the case where (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium while (am−1, . . . , am−1) is not. In particular, this implies p < 1. 
Consider the strictly decreasing sequence
(
t(am, s
0
m), t(am−1, s0m), t(am−1, s1m), . . . , t(am−1, sN−1m )
)
of the target guesses. Note that the difference
t(am, s
0
m) − t(am−1, s0m) = t(am−1, sκm) − t(am−1, sκ+1m ) =
p
N
(am − am−1) (A.3)
does not depend on κ , i.e., the sequence decreases at a constant rate. Moreover, since (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium,
am ≥ t(am, s0m) > t(am−1, s0m) ≥
1
2
(am + am−1) > am−1 ≥ t(am−1, sN−1m ). (A.4)
Deﬁne κ∗ := min{κ ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} : 12 (am + am−1) > t(am−1, sκm) ≥ am−1}. Intuitively, this is the smallest number of oppo-
nents that must choose am−1 such that choosing am−1 yields a strictly higher utility than am . Note that by (A.3) and (A.4), 
we obtain pN ≤ 12 , and therefore such a κ exists (the fact that κ ≥ 1 follows from a¯m being a Nash equilibrium). Consider 
the following cases:
• Let κ∗ ≤ N−12 or equivalently κ∗ ≤ N − 1 − κ∗ , i.e., there are (weakly) fewer opponents choosing am−1 than those 
choosing am at sκ
∗
m . Let us ﬁrst prove that
ui(am−1, sκ
∗
m ) ≥ ui(an, sκ
∗
m ) (A.5)
for all n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M}. Observe that
ui(am−1, sκ
∗
m ) =
1
κ∗ + 1 ≥
1
N − κ∗ = ui(am, s
κ∗
m ).
Moreover, by Lemma A.2 (ii), it follows that (A.5) holds for every n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M}. Now, let us prove it for every 
n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 2}. By construction, t(am−1, sκ∗m ) ≥ am−1. Hence, by p ≤ 1 and N > 2,
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∗
m ) = t(am−1, sκ
∗
m ) −
p
N
(am−1 − am−2)
≥ am−1 − p
N
(am−1 − am−2)
> am−1 − 1
2
(am−1 − am−2)
= 1
2
(am−1 + am−2),
implying that di(am−2, sκ
∗
m ) > d j(am−2, sκ
∗
m ), with j = i being an opponent of i who chooses am−1 (recall that such j
exists, since κ∗ ≥ 1). Hence, ui(am−1, sκ∗m ) > ui(am−2, sκ∗m ), and thus (A.5) follows for all n ∈ {0, . . . , m −2} by Lemma A.2
(i). This implies that am−1 is a best response to sκ
∗
m ∈ {s−i ∈ S−i : s j ∈ {am−1, am} for all j = i}.
• Let κ∗ > N−12 , i.e., more than half of the opponents choose am−1. Since κ∗ ∈N, we have κ∗ ≥ N − κ∗ . Since additionally 
p < 1, we obtain t(am−1, sκ
∗−1
m ) = p κ
∗am−1+(N−κ∗)am
N <
am+am−1
2 , a contradiction to the deﬁnition of κ
∗ .
Combining the previous cases completes the proof.
(ii) Consider the mixed strategy σmi ∈ (Bmi ), attaching probability λ ∈
( N
1+N , 1
)
to am−1 and equal probability 1−λm−1 to 
each an ∈ {a0, . . . , am−2}. Then, consider the following two cases:
• Let s−i ∈ Bm−i be such that ui(am, s−i) = 0. Then, by Lemma A.1 applied in the reduced game Bm1 × · · · × BmN , we obtain
ui(σ
m
i , s−i) = λui(am−1, s−i) +
1− λ
m − 1
m−2∑
n=0
ui(an, s−i) > 0 = ui(am, s−i).
Indeed, for every s−i ∈ Bm−i there exists some n ∈ {0, . . . , m} with ui(an, s−i) > 0, and since ui(am, s−i) = 0 it must be 
the case that ui(an, s−i) > 0 for some n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}.
• Let s−i ∈ Bm−i be such that ui(am, s−i) > 0. Since (am, . . . , am) is not a Nash equilibrium, it follows by Theorem 1 (i) that 
p < pm , and therefore by Lemma A.4 that
ui(am−1, s−i) − ui(am, s−i) ≥ 1
N
(A.6)
for all s−i ∈ Bm−i such that ui(am, s−i) > 0. Moreover, by the deﬁnition of the utility function
1
m − 1
m−2∑
n=0
ui(an, s−i) − ui(am, s−i) ≥ −1. (A.7)
Multiply both sides of (A.6) with λ, and both sides of (A.7) with 1 − λ, and add the respective sides to obtain
ui(σ
m
i , s−i) − ui(am, s−i) ≥
λ
N
+ λ − 1
= λ1+ N
N
− 1 > 0, (A.8)
with the strict inequality in (A.8) following directly by λ > N1+N , which is true by our construction of σ
m
i . Hence, we 
obtain ui(σmi , s−i) > ui(am, s−i).
Combining the previous two cases proves that am is strictly dominated by σmi in B
m
1 × · · · × BmN . 
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 3.
(i) Fix some m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1} and deﬁne a strategy proﬁle
sκm = ( am, . . . ,am︸ ︷︷ ︸
N − κ − 1 times
,am+1, . . . ,am+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ times
) ∈ S−i
where κ ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. If (am, . . . , am) is not a Nash equilibrium, am+1 is a best response to s0m (by Lemma 2), whereas if 
(am+1, . . . , am+1) is a Nash equilibrium, am+1 is trivially a best response to sN−1m . So, we focus on the case where (am, . . . , am)
is a Nash equilibrium while (am+1, . . . , am+1) is not. This implies p > 1. Consider the strictly increasing sequence
(
t(am, s
0
m), t(am+1, s
0
m), t(am+1, s
1
m), . . . , t(am+1, s
N−1
m )
)
of the target guesses. Note that the difference
86 C. Seel, E. Tsakas / Games and Economic Behavior 106 (2017) 75–88t(am+1, s0m) − t(am, s0m) = t(am+1, sκ+1m ) − t(am−1, sκm) =
p
N
(am+1 − am) (A.9)
does not depend on κ . Moreover, since (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium,
am ≤ t(am, s0m) < t(am+1, s0m) ≤
1
2
(am + am+1) < am+1 ≤ t(am+1, sN−1m ). (A.10)
Then we deﬁne κ∗ := min{k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} : 12 (am + am+1) < t(am+1, sκm) ≤ am+1}. By (A.9) and (A.10), we obtain pN ≤ 12 , 
and hence such a κ exists. In fact if it holds with equality then t(am+1, s0m) = 12 (am + am+1), in which case am+1 is a best 
response to a¯−im , and we are done. Hence, we take 
p
N <
1
2 . Consider the following cases:
• Let κ∗ ≤ N−12 . Let us ﬁrst prove that
ui(am+1, sκ
∗
m ) ≥ ui(an, sκ
∗
m ) (A.11)
for all n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}. Note that
ui(am+1, sκ
∗
m ) =
1
κ∗ + 1 ≥
1
N − κ∗ = ui(am, s
κ∗
m ).
Moreover, by Lemma A.3 (ii), it follows that (A.11) holds for every n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}. Now, let us prove it for every 
n ∈ {m + 2, . . . , M}. By construction, t(am+1, sκ∗m ) ≤ am+1. Hence, by pN ≤ 12 ,
t(am+2, sκ
∗
m ) = t(am+1, sκ
∗
m ) +
p
N
(am+2 − am+1)
< am+1 + 1
2
(am+2 − am+1)
= 1
2
(am+1 + am+2),
implying that di(am+2, sκ
∗
m ) > d j(am+2, s
κ∗
m ), with j = i being an opponent of i who chooses am+1 (recall that such j ex-
ists, since κ∗ ≥ 1). Hence, ui(am+1, sκ∗m ) > ui(am+2, sκ
∗
m ), and thus (A.11) follows for all n ∈ {m +2, . . . , M} by Lemma A.3
(i). Hence am+1 is a best response to sκ
∗
m .
• Let κ∗ > N−12 , i.e., more than half of the opponents choose am+1. Since κ∗ ∈N, we have κ∗ ≥ N − κ∗ . Since additionally 
p > 1, we obtain t(am−1, sκ
∗−1
m ) = p κ
∗am+1+(N−κ∗)am
N >
am+am+1
2 , a contradiction to the deﬁnition of κ
∗ .
Combining the previous cases completes the proof.
(ii) The proof is almost identical to the one of Lemma A.4. Consider the mixed strategy σmi ∈ (Ami ), attaching probability 
λ ∈ ( N1+N , 1
)
to am+1 and equal probability 1−λM−m−1 to each an ∈ {am+2, . . . , aM}. Then, consider the following two cases:
• Let ui(am, s−i) = 0. Then, by Lemma A.1, we obtain
ui(σ
m
i , s−i) = λui(am+1, s−i) +
1− λ
M −m − 1
M∑
n=m+2
ui(an, s−i) > 0 = ui(am, s−i).
• Let ui(am, s−i) > 0. Since (am, . . . , am) is not a Nash equilibrium, it follows by Theorem 1 (ii) that p > pm , and therefore 
by Lemma A.5 that
ui(am+1, s−i) − ui(am, s−i) ≥ 1
N
(A.12)
for all s−i ∈ Am−i such that ui(am, s−i) > 0. Moreover, by the deﬁnition of the utility function
1
M −m − 1
M∑
n=m+2
ui(an, s−i) − ui(am, s−i) ≥ −1. (A.13)
Multiply (A.12) by λ and (A.13) by 1 − λ, and add the respective sides to obtain
ui(σ
m
i , s−i) − ui(am, s−i) ≥
λ
N
+ λ − 1 > 0,
with the strict inequality following from λ > N1+N , thus obtaining ui(σ
m
i , s−i) > ui(am, s−i).
Combining the previous two cases proves that am is strictly dominated by σm in Am × · · · × Am . i 1 N
C. Seel, E. Tsakas / Games and Economic Behavior 106 (2017) 75–88 87Proof of Theorem 2. We begin with suﬃciency. Let (am, . . . , am) and (an, . . . , an) be two symmetric Nash equilibria (with 
m < n). For every i ∈ I , take Cm,ni := Ami ∩ Bni = {am, am+1, . . . , an}. Then, it suﬃces to prove that
Cm,n1 × · · · × Cm,nN
is a best response set. Consider the following two cases:
• Let p ≤ 1. It follows from Lemma 3 (i) that for all  ∈ {m, . . . , n − 1} there exists some s−i ∈ {s′−i ∈ S−i : s′j ∈
{a, a+1} for all j = i} ⊆ Cm,n−i such that a is a best response to s−i . Moreover, by (am, . . . , am) being a Nash equi-
librium, am is a best response to a¯−im ∈ Cm,n−i .• Now let p ≥ 1. It follows from Lemma 4 (i) that for all  ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n} there exists some s−i ∈ {s′−i ∈ S−i : s′j ∈
{a−1, a} for all j = i} ⊆ Cm,n−i such that a is a best response to s−i . Moreover, by (an, . . . , an) being a Nash equilibrium, 
an is a best response to a¯−in ∈ Cm,n−i .
Combining the two cases completes the proof of suﬃciency for every p ∈ R+ . Necessity is proven separately for p ≤ 1 and 
p ≥ 1 below.
(i) It follows from Theorem 1 that (a0, . . . , a0) is a Nash equilibrium, and therefore also rationalizable. Deﬁne m :=
max{n ∈ {0, . . . , M} : p ≥ pn}. Again by Theorem 1 it follows that (am, . . . , am) is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, am is rational-
izable for every m ∈ {0, . . . , m}. For m < M , it remains to prove that no m ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M} is rationalizable. We proceed 
by induction. It follows from Lemma 3 (ii) that for an arbitrary m ∈ {m + 1, . . . , M} the strategy am is strictly dominated in 
Bm1 × · · · × BmN , and therefore am /∈ RM−m+1i . Hence, am /∈ R∗i , thus completing this part of the proof.
(ii) The proof follows the same steps as Part (i) above. It follows from Theorem 1 that (aM , . . . , aM) is rationalizable. 
Deﬁne m := min{n ∈ {0, . . . , M} : p ≤ qn}. Again by Theorem 1 it follows that (am, . . . , am) is rationalizable for every m ∈
{m, . . . , M}. For m > 0, it remains prove that no m ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} is rationalizable. We proceed by induction. It follows 
from Lemma 4 (ii) that for an arbitrary m ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} the strategy am is strictly dominated in Am1 × · · · × AmN , and 
therefore am /∈ Rm+1i . Hence, am /∈ R∗i , thus completing the proof. 
A.4. Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Corollary 1. When the strategy set is Si = {0, . . . , M}, the threshold parameters become pm = 2Nm−N2Nm−2 for m ∈{1, . . . , M} and p0 = 0. Observe that pm is nondecreasing in m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , M} (resp., strictly increasing if p < 1). Hence, for 
an arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1], we ﬁnd m = max{n ∈ {0, . . . , M} : p ≥ pn}, noticing that p ≥ pm if and only if m ≤ m. But then, it 
follows from Theorem 2 (ii) that p ≥ pm if and only if m is rationalizable. 
Proof of Corollary 2. When the strategy set is Si = {0, . . . , M}, the threshold parameters become qm = 2Nm+N2Nm+2 for m ∈{0, . . . , M − 1} and qM = ∞. Hence, qm is nonincreasing for m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}, thus implying qM > q0 ≥ qm for all m ∈
{0, . . . , M − 1}.
(i) Take an arbitrary p ≤ N2 = q0. By Theorem 1 (ii), the proﬁles (0, . . . , 0) and (M, . . . , M) are Nash equilibria. Hence, by 
Theorem 2, every m ∈ {0, . . . , M} is rationalizable.
(ii) Take an arbitrary p > N2 = q0, thus implying p > qm for every m ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}. Hence, by Theorem 1 (ii), the only 
Nash equilibrium is (M, . . . , M). Thus, by Theorem 2 (ii), the only rationalizable strategy is M . 
A.5. Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Proposition 1. We know that in general S∗i ⊆ R∗i . Hence, it suﬃces to show that R∗i ⊆ S∗i . Take p ≤ 1. Then, by 
Theorem 2 (i), we obtain R∗i = {a0, . . . , am}. Note that R∗1 × · · · × R∗i is a independent best response set. Indeed, am is a best 
response to the (independent) belief that puts probability 1 to a¯−im , and for every m ∈ {0, . . . , m}, the pure strategy am is a 
best response to an (independent) belief that puts probability 1 to some s−i ∈ {s′−i ∈ S−i : s j ∈ {am, am+1} for all j = i} ⊆ R∗−i
by Lemma 3 (ii). The proof is similar for p ≥ 1. In particular, we obtain R∗i = {am, . . . , aM}. Then, aM is a rational for the 
(independent) belief that puts probability 1 to a¯−iM , and for every m ∈ {m−1, . . . , M}, the pure strategy am is a best response 
to an (independent) belief that puts probability 1 to some s−i ∈ {s′−i ∈ S−i : s j ∈ {am, am−1} for all j = i} ⊆ R∗−i by Lemma 4
(ii). 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Note that in any game Bmi , by Lemma 3 (i), only strategy am can be dominated. By our charac-
terization of R∗i , strategy am is dominated if and only if m >m. Thus, strategy am is eliminated in round k + 1 if and only if 
m = M − k >m, i.e., formally, Rk+1i = Rki \ {aM−k} in this case.
(ii) The proof is analogous to Part (i). In any game Ami , by Lemma 4 (i), only strategy am can be dominated. By our 
characterization of R∗i , strategy am is dominated if and only if m <m. Thus, strategy am is eliminated in round k + 1 if and 
only if m = k <m, i.e., Rk+1i = Rki \ {ak}. 
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